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Abstract 
Using the securitization framework to highlight the arguments that facilitated the 
“War on Drugs”, this paper highlights a separate war against drug traffickers.  
Facilitated by ideology through the rhetoric promoted by the “War on Drugs,” the 
fear of communist expansion and democratic contraction, the “War on Drug 
Traffickers” was implemented, requiring its own strategy separate from the “War 
on Drugs.” This is an important distinction because the play on words changes the 
perception of the issue from one of drug addiction to one of weak institutions and 
insurgent/terrorist threat to those institutions.  Furthermore, one cannot propose 
strategy to win, lose, or retreat in a war that one has been unable to identify 
properly. And while the all-encompassing “War on Drugs” has motivated 
tremendous discourse on its failure and possible solutions to remedy its failure, 
the generalizations made as a result of the inability to distinguish between the 
policies behind drug addiction and the militarized policies behind drug trafficking 
have discounted the effect of violence perpetrated by the state, the rationale for 
the state perpetrating that violence, and the dependence that the state has on 
foreign actors to perpetrate such violence. This makes it impossible to not only 
propose effective strategy but also to persuade states that participate in the “War 
on Drug Traffickers” to adopt the proposed strategy. 
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Introduction 
The “War on Drugs” is a rhetorical war that has been popularly categorized as 
United States (U.S.) drug prohibition in the 20th century. Looking beyond its 
name, is it attached to militarized drug prohibition? Military engagement must 
occur for a “war” to occur, and drugs cannot be personified to the extent 
necessary to actually go to war with them.  Yet around the world countries1 have 
implemented militarized counter-narcotics policies that are separate from the 
supply/consumption policies of the “War on Drugs.” This takes the “War on 
Drugs” from rhetoric to military strategy and expands it to include a “War on 
Drug Traffickers.” The distinction is necessary because one cannot propose a 
strategy to win, lose, or retreat in a war that one has been unable to properly 
identify.  
 
The all-encompassing “War on Drugs” has motivated tremendous discourse on its 
failure and possible solutions to remedy its failure.  The generalizations made as a 
result of the inability to distinguish between the policies behind drug addiction 
and the militarized policies against drug trafficking have discounted the effect of 
violence perpetrated by the state, the rationale for the state perpetrating that 
violence, and the dependence that the state has on foreign actors to perpetrate 
such violence. The lack of consideration for their rationale to perpetrate violence 
and their dependence on foreign actors perpetrating such violence would result in 
a failed proposition.  The lack of consideration for the effects of violence 
perpetrated by the state would result in an inefficient policy.  Without the 
distinction between these wars and the considerations involved with their 
distinction, it is impossible to not only propose effective strategy but also to 
persuade states involved in the “War on Drug Traffickers” to adopt any proposed 
strategy.    
 
The purpose of this paper is to distinguish between the “War on Drugs” and the 
resulting “War on Drug Traffickers” so that the implementation, rationale for 
                                                            
1 The terms “countries” and “states” are used interchangeably throughout this paper.  
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implementation, and effects of implementation of the resulting militarized drug 
policies can be studied.  The goal of this research is to dissect the motivating 
factors for extreme counter-narcotics policies to effectively strategize how to 
transition from such policies.  Since this paper is at the foundational level of this 
research, it is focused on the U.S. as the popularly cited creator of the “War on 
Drugs.”  
 
To understand the rationale behind going to war with drug traffickers and the 
implementation of the militarized counter-narcotics policies that invoke the “War 
on Drug Traffickers,” a historical analysis was conducted of former President 
Richard Nixon’s drug policy and of former President Ronald Reagan’s National 
Security Decision Directives.  The most influential arguments and intelligence 
that dictated – or at the very least molded – the argument for the resulting 
militarized counter-narcotics policies was highlighted.  As a result, this paper 
finds that former President Ronald Reagan was the influential actor of the 
“Speech Act” that changed the discourse in drug policy facilitating its expansion.2  
 
This paper first begins with the framework used to conduct this historical 
analysis, Buzan, Waever, and Wilde’s (1998) “In Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis.”3 The framework is used to highlight the change in discourse, also 
known as the securitizing moves in which the United States expanded the “War 
on Drugs” to include a “War on Drug Traffickers.”  Second, this paper will use 
that framework to detail how the “War on Drug Traffickers” came to fruition and 
why it is separate from the “War on Drugs.” Further research to understand what 
drove countries around the world to militarize their counter-narcotics policies 
should be conducted to understand not only what drove these countries, but what 
commonalities these countries share among each other and the U.S.  Although 
research into the motivating factors that facilitated implementation of the “War on 
Drug Traffickers” has not been conducted, this paper will end with a discussion 
                                                            
2 This paper at no point discounts the covert operations conducted by the U.S. in other countries, 
but only focuses on the military operations that were conducted after the drug trade was articulated 
as a national security threat.  
3 Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, 1998. 
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on the possible motivating factors that proposed policies must take into 
consideration.   
Theoretical Framework of Buzan, Waever, and Wilde (1998): 
Politicization/Securitization 
Traditionally, the security of a state could only be threatened by another state.4 
This limitation allowed for extreme threats such as military engagement to come 
from a state only.  As a result, security issues were easily identified because they 
were always stemming from states whose political agendas, assertions or acts 
could be noted as a threat to another state.  During the Cold War, security threats 
were expanded beyond states to include non-traditional threats of individual 
citizens/non-citizens, organizations, and drug traffickers.  Identifying threats 
became more difficult because they began to come from anyone or anything.  To 
control for those endless possibilities, Buzan, Weaver, and Wilde (1998) created 
the “securitization” framework.  For this paper to identify what promoted the 
threat of a drug trafficker to be equal to the threat of another state, the study 
would have to be conducted within this framework.  This section will focus on the 
securitization framework so that the following sections can use the framework to 
sift through the “War on Drugs” progression and expansion into the “War on 
Drug Traffickers.” 
 
For non-traditional security threats, the securitization framework establishes the 
process of a threat going from a minimal social threat to an existential state threat 
resulting in extreme policies such as military action.  This framework allows for a 
non-traditional security threat that becomes a national security threat to be studied 
and properly identified.  The framework is the following:  
(1) a claim made by the securitizing actor that something is 
existentially threatening some valued referent object; (2) the 
securitizing actor’s audience holds value to that referent object and 
accepts the claim made by the securitizing actor; and (3) that 
audience allows for the implementation of extreme tactics (such as 
                                                            
4 Andreas and Price, 2001, 31-52. 
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military engagement) by the securitizing actor to protect their valued 
referent object.5  
 
This is also known as the Speech Act in which the proper actor’s speech gains 
consent from the authorizing audience to implement extreme policies.6 The key to 
securitization is for the speech to gain acceptance so that the audience will allow 
the speaker to implement extreme policies. In other words:  
Securitization […] does not simply come into being when one 
actor declares an existential threat; this is merely the securitizing 
move.  Instead, a securitization exists only at the point when a 
designated audience accepts the speech act.  Securitization is 
thus both a performative speech act, whereby in speaking 
security it is done, as well as an intersubjective process between 
the securitizing actor and an audience.  Once an issue has been 
‘accepted’ by an audience, a securitizing actor is in the position 
to evoke emergency measures and go beyond established rules in 
an effort to address the threat.  ‘Securitization is fulfilled […] by 
cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules.7   
 
For the state to use its own military to domestically go on the offense and/or 
defense with drug traffickers, the state must perceive that drug traffickers are an 
existential threat.  But the “…discourse that takes the form of presenting 
something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create 
securitization-this is a securitizing move…”,  hence the “War on Drugs.”8 Noting 
the discourse is key for pinpointing the time that drug policy shifted into the 
military sector and most importantly for noting the motivating factors for the 
resulting militarized counter-narcotics policies.  
 
Before the securitization of drug traffickers can occur, and before the expansion 
of perceived threats that motivate drug policy to militarize can occur, drugs 
themselves have to be lifted from the social realm to the political realm, allowing 
for their threat to be felt by actual decision makers.   Politicized issues are 
“…(part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations 
                                                            
5 As stated above, this framework is derived from Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, 1998. 
6 See Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, 1998. 
7 Floyd and Croft, 2011, 155. 
8 Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, 1998, 25. 
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or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance)…”9 For the audience 
to be introduced and begin accepting the claim that the state, its referent object, 
was/is being threatened by drug traffickers requiring the implementation of 
militarized counter-narcotics policies, the supply of drugs would have to be 
politicized; also known as the securitizing move discussed above.10 This explains 
how the policy regarding narcotics became political and rose to the level requiring 
military action.  
 
The following sections will put this framework to use while exploring the 
securitizing moves that led to the “War on Drug Traffickers.” The next section 
will use this framework to establish why the “War on Drugs” was a successful 
securitizing move that led to the securitization of drug traffickers around the 
world.  A discussion of why the “War on Drugs” did not complete the framework 
but instead became the securitizing move for the “War on Drug Traffickers” will 
show that not only are we dealing with completely separate issues, but we are 
dealing with issues that require completely separate strategies and policies.  
Background: Beginning with the “War on Drugs” 
Former President Richard Nixon is recognized for his contributions with initiating 
the “War on Drugs.” In 1971, he stated that “America’s public enemy number one 
. . . is drug abuse” and “[i]n order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to 
wage a new, all-out offensive.”11 At this point, the claim was an attempt by the 
executive of a state to place drug abuse, or the commodities that people abuse, as 
the number-one threat to that state.  To “wage a new, all-out offensive” would 
seem to signal the Speech Act requirement for securitization especially since 
policies were implemented, or at least referenced as being implemented, because 
of former President Richard Nixon’s speech.12 His speech, however, was focused 
on demand issues such as rehabilitation.  The goal was to assist our military 
                                                            
9 Id. at 23. 
10 The politicization of these drug suppliers is the securitizing move that facilitates the 
securitization of drug traffickers.   
11 Nixon, 1971, 202 (Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control). 
12 Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, 1998, 26.  
Liana Eustacia Reyes 
7 
 
stationed abroad, in particular Vietnam,13 while also assisting society as a whole 
from succumbing to the hardships of drug addiction.  
 
Drugs had been taken from the social realm and placed in the political realm 
allowing for the resulting rehabilitative, judicial, and police remedies to be put in 
place.  Former President Richard Nixon established the Special Action Office of 
Drug Abuse Prevention within the Executive Office as a “central authority with 
overall responsibility for all major Federal drug abuse prevention, education, 
treatment, rehabilitation, training, and research programs in all Federal 
agencies.”14 Drugs had been effectively politicized and elevated into the executive 
branch.  Although the resulting policies would involve executive control of drug 
policy and obstructing the ability to invoke some rights such as the “no-knock 
searches,” actual military engagement or intrastate war did not occur, meaning 
that securitization did not occur.15  
 
For years, drugs were deemed an uncontrollable threat with no discriminatory 
qualities and only horrifying effects for those who consumed them.  Society as a 
whole was at this social issue’s mercy.  Former President Richard Nixon’s 
categorizing of drugs as an addictive threat with no discriminatory qualities would 
allow the U.S. to begin securitizing this group of commodities due to the resulting 
fear of not knowing who its next victim would be – a fear potentially experienced 
by the securitizing audience.16 However, the inability of a person, let alone a state, 
to go on the offensive with a commodity, regardless of its personification, 
                                                            
13 In his speech, Nixon notes that “Vietnam … has brought to our attention the fact that a number 
of young American have become addicts as they serve abroad…” Nixon, 1971, 202.   
14 Nixon, 1971, 203 (Special Message to the Congress on Drug abuse Prevention and Control). 
15 See Floyd and Croft, 2011, 161 “The analyst using securitization theory must not focus on what 
security, is, but only on what it does – because what is done in the name of security is tantamount 
to the meaning of security.” 
16 See Andreas, Bertram, Blachman, and Sharpe, Winter 1991-1992, 160: “The spread of crack 
cocaine and the dramatic escalation of drug-related violence in the 1980s led first Ronald Reagan 
and then George Bush to "declare war" on drugs. By the end of the decade, more Americans 
identified drugs as the number-one threat to the country than any other problem.” For even more 
detail on the U.S. perception of drugs, see The White House National Drug Control Strategy, 
September 1989.  
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prevents drugs from fitting the securitization framework as a securitized issue in 
the military sector, and leaves it in the political sector as a politicized issue.   
 
Even though drugs themselves are unable to fit within the framework for 
securitization, their politicized threat is successful enough to facilitate the 
securitization of its suppliers now placing drug traffickers within the scope of 
review for a securitized threat.  This is still an incredible political move because 
the claim for an all-out offensive was, prior to former President Richard Nixon’s 
declaration, a claim traditionally made against another state and/or government.17 
Up until that point, the claim was only being made against communism and/or 
communist states.  Therefore, former President Richard Nixon placed drugs in the 
realm of a state threat that needed to be offensively attacked because it would 
have severe consequences for anyone and everyone. This meant that the door was 
officially open to a new area of U.S. and international security: political drug 
control.18  
 
Former President Richard Nixon’s speech facilitated the supply reduction policies 
that would begin looking at “source countries” versus focusing only on domestic 
consumption.  He specifically noted:  
America has the largest number of heroin addicts of any nation in 
the world. And yet, America does not grow opium-of which 
heroin is a derivative--nor does it manufacture heroin, which is a 
laboratory process carried out abroad. This deadly poison in the 
American life stream is, in other words, a foreign import.19  
 
The growing belief was that the U.S. alone could not solve its problem at home.  
The fact that drugs originated in foreign countries required the cooperation of 
foreign governments to allow the U.S. to prevent their drugs from infiltrating U.S. 
borders.20 Policies that followed would involve a shift in the military sector at 
home and abroad.   
                                                            
17 See Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, 1998. 
18 For further discussion on the military sector see Id at 49-70. 
19 Nixon, 1971, 203 (Special Message to the Congress on Drug abuse Prevention and Control). 
20 Bartilow and Eom, 2009, 93-116 (Citing The Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force 1975: 
50) . 
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This next section focuses on placing President Ronald Reagan’s National Security 
Decision Directives within the securitization framework.  Although former 
President Richard Nixon did not securitize the issue of drugs, former President 
Ronald Reagan continued on this path securitizing the threat of those who traded 
drugs. The following establishes how the “War on Drug Traffickers” came to be.   
Discussion: The Securitization of Drug Traffickers and the Resulting War 
In 1986, former President Ronald Reagan in his National Security Decision 
Directive Number 221 made the Speech Act – a textually intricate argument that 
causally linked drugs to a trade that destabilized democratic states and/or 
democracies.  He argued that the ability for the drug trade to fund not only 
criminal trafficking organizations but also insurgents and terrorist groups that 
were attempting to overthrow their/a democratic state/democracy was an 
existential threat to U.S. National Security and democracy as a whole.21 This 
argument by former President Ronald Reagan solidified, through documentation22 
and unilateral action,23 that the rhetorical “War on Drugs” would encompass an 
actual “War on Drug Traffickers” facilitated by ideology and fear: a precursor to 
the “War on Terror.”  
 
What had previously consumed the position of threat to the U.S., other states, 
became equalized with an individual’s exploitation of a commodity.  The 
unilateral act of a President to link the supply of drugs to drug traffickers that 
were also simultaneously behaving as insurgents and/or terrorists attempting to 
overthrow democratic governments and/or democracy is noteworthy when one 
acknowledges that at the time, U.S. identity was very much pro-democracy, anti-
terrorist, anti-insurgent, and most importantly, anti-Soviet.24 This sharing of threat 
capability between states, insurgents, terrorists, and drug traffickers to 
                                                            
21 Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1986, 221.  
22 For more on National Security Decision Directives, their importance, power, and use by former 
President Reagan, See Dwyer, 2002, 411-413; Gordon, 2007, 351-366; and Newman, 2001, 81. 
23 Gordon, 2007, 350. 
24 See Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 161; For a deeper look into U.S. ideology and the history of 
foreign policy, or even the rise of the National Security Doctrine, also see Andreas and Price, 
2001, 37-51 and Queiser Morales, July 1989, 147-153.  
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existentially threaten democracy and/or democratic states not only expanded U.S. 
National Security, appropriation ceilings, disbursements, and Foreign Policy, but 
it internationally shifted political relationships, limitations to sovereignty, foreign 
aid, and ultimately the relationship between a state and a non-state actor.25 This 
would take the rhetoric of the “War on Drugs” and turn it into actual strategy for 
implementing the “War on Drug Traffickers.”  
 
As Rita Floyd and Stuart Croft (2011) note, “[p]rovided that the securitization is 
successful, the analyst can then identify the emergency measures that follow.”26 
This next section will discuss the resulting emergency measures that followed the 
securitization of drug traffickers. Further research is necessary to study the states 
that implemented such emergency measures, the relationship they share with one 
another, and the relationship they share with the United States. 
The “War on Drug Traffickers” 
 
National Security Decision Directive Number (NSDD) 221 was the Speech Act 
that securitized drug traffickers.  The NSDD itself was a speech tool used by 
former President Ronald Reagan that gave him the authority to unilaterally act, 
create National Security policy, and have the force of law.27 Former President 
Ronald Reagan’s audience, U.S. Congress, responded in the form of this strong 
act with the implementation of policies that ranged from the 1986 Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act to militarized policies in Latin American States.  Peter Andreas (2006) 
stated that “by the end of the 1990s, antidrug programs represented more than 92 
percent of U.S. military and police aid to the Western hemisphere.”28  
 
Although National Security strategy had primarily been focused on the 
Soviet threat since former President Ronald Reagan’s NSDD 32, it expanded to 
                                                            
25 See Congressional Reports: Storrs, April 8, 1998; Perl, 2006; Wyler, 2011; Also see Bartilow 
and Eom, 2009, 93-116; Lindau, 2011, 177-200; Falco, 1995, 15; Ayling, 2005, 376-383; and 
Sciolino, 1988. 
26 Floyd and Croft, 2011, 173. 
27 Dwyer, 2002, 411. 
28 Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006. 
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include narcotics trafficking by NSDD 221.  In NSDD 221, former President 
Reagan articulated:  
The international drug trade threatens the national security of the 
United States by potentially destabilizing democratic allies. It is 
therefore the policy of the United States, in cooperation with 
other nations, to halt the production and flow of illicit narcotics, 
reduce the ability of insurgent and terrorist groups to use drug 
trafficking to support their activities, and strengthen the ability of 
individual governments to confront and defeat this threat.29 
 
NSDD 221 placed drug trafficking within the offices of the Department of 
Defense – drug trafficking was now legitimately within the military sector of the 
U.S. 30 A few months later, NSDD 238 replaced NSDD 32 as the primary source 
of U.S. National Security Strategy.31 The trafficking of illicit drugs as a U.S. 
National Security threat would continue to evolve from NSDD 221 making its 
way into NSDD 238 as an official component of National Security Strategy 
solidifying that the threat had transitioned from the political sector to the military 
sector.32    
 
The Western hemisphere was the focal region for former President Ronald 
Reagan’s NSDD 221.  According to former President Ronald Reagan, “[w]hile 
these problems are endemic to most nations plagued by narcotics, their effects are 
particularly insidious for the democratic states of the Western Hemisphere.”33 
Before NSDD 221, former President Ronald Reagan had made it clear that the 
Western Hemisphere was a focal point for avoiding Soviet expansion, terrorism 
and insurgencies.  He had asserted that “U.S. national interests in Latin America 
and the region dictate policies that achieve the following objectives: a region free 
of Soviet-dominated or hostile environments.”34 To do so required that our 
policies be focused on “radical insurgent movements supported by the Soviet 
                                                            
29 Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1986, 221. 
30 Id. 
31 Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1986, 238. 
32 Id. 
33 Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1986, 221. 
34 See Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1986, 71. 
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Union and/or its surrogates.”35 The focus on Soviet influence in the Western 
Hemisphere, insurgencies and terrorists backed by the Soviet Union, coupled with 
the new threat of drug trafficking as a funding stream for these groups, promoted 
the threat of drug trafficking to a U.S. National Security threat.36  
 
Former President Ronald Reagan saw the federal government as an institution to 
deal with drugs through foreign policy, and looked to the states and local 
governments to deal with drug consumption through local laws.37 He was 
influenced by the “cocaine wars” in Miami, crack addiction in New York, and a 
booming drug industry within the early 1980s that was showing spectacular 
growth during an “…increasing economic crisis…”38 He was also influenced by 
the term “narcoterrorism” that was introduced in 1983 by then Peruvian President 
Belaúnde Terry.  Although former President Richard Nixon is noted for 
establishing the “War on Drugs,” the credit for the “War on Drug Traffickers” 
belongs to former President Ronald Reagan.  While the Nixon Administration was 
focused on the addictive qualities of drugs, the Reagan Administration, focused 
on the Soviet threat,39 found that countries losing their democratic transitions 
were supplying drugs.  The presence of leftist/Marxist insurgents or terrorists, 
who were all simultaneously behaving as drug traffickers attempting to overthrow 
the democratic process gave the necessary evidence to facilitate the securitization 
of drug traffickers and shift the “War on Drugs” from rhetoric to military strategy.   
 
Two military operations that have been discussed in reference to the resulting 
militarized counter-narcotics policies in Latin America with U.S. military 
assistance are Operations Snowcap and Operation Blast Furnace.  Operation 
Snowcap “involved extensive coordinated military operations in Guatemala, 
Panama, Costa Rica, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico” with chemical control, vehicle interdiction and marine 
                                                            
35 Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1982, 71.  
36 Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1984, 138 and Reagan National Security 
Decision Directive Number, 1985, 179. 
37 Benoit, 2003, 283.  
38 Vellinga, 2004.  
39 See Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1982, 32. 
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law enforcement interdiction operations all conducted to suppress coca.40 
Operation Blast Furnace, utilizing American and Bolivian military personnel, 
launched a series of raids against cocaine laboratories in Bolivia.41 By 1989, the 
military could arrest drug traffickers and fugitives on foreign territory 
with/without the host country’s authorization.42 As Andreas and Nadelmann 
noted, “drug enforcement became the defining feature of post-cold war U.S. 
military relations with many of its southern neighbors.”43  
 
The U.S. international counter-narcotics policy has been characteristically defined 
as having a strong military perspective.44 In 1986, drug trafficking was declared a 
national security threat by former President Ronald Reagan, requiring the U.S. to 
act in its most defensive and offensive manner with military intelligence, 
interdiction, and aerial spraying, among other things.  Three years later, former 
President George Bush defined an Andean strategy that included an active role of 
U.S. armed forces (Pentagon and Southern Command) and those of the Andean 
countries in the combat against drug trafficking.45 The Reagan Administration’s 
policy would intensify, continue, and further pressure/assist Latin American 
countries under The Bush and Clinton Administrations with Plan Colombia, and 
following with the GW Bush Administration’s Andean Initiative in 2001.46  
 
Foreign governments adhered to “…U.S. pressure by creating specialized drug 
enforcement agencies, adopting U.S. style investigative techniques, signing 
extradition treaties with the U.S., hosting U.S. law enforcement agents within 
their borders and have adopted U.S. approaches to criminal law and drug 
enforcement.”47 In the end, former President Ronald Reagan’s NSDD 221 would 
be the Speech Act resulting in not only the securitization of drug traffickers, but 
also a war that expanded the rhetorical war requiring any counter-narcotics 
                                                            
40 Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006.  
41 Id. at 164.  
42 Id. at 164. 
43 Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006.  
44 Valderrama and Cabieses, 2004, 53. 
45 Id.  
46 Astorga  in Vellinga, 2004, 93; and see Perl, 2006, 15-16. 
47 Bartilow and Eom, 2009, 93-116. 
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policies proposed thereafter to properly identify which counter-narcotics war it 
was attempting to deal with.  This section has established how the rhetorical “War 
on Drugs” expanded to include the actual “War on Drug Traffickers.” This next 
section will focus on why proper identification of the issues matter in the context 
of counter-narcotics policies.  
Implications 
This research highlights a different war that was facilitated by ideology through 
the rhetoric promoted by the “War on Drugs,” fear of communist expansion, and 
fear of democratic contraction, requiring its own study and strategy separate from 
the “War on Drugs.” With a strong Soviet threat still looming, drug addiction 
booming, leftist/Marxist insurgent/terrorist drug traffickers threatening insecure 
democratic institutions, perceived to be weak democratic allies, and a geopolitical 
focus on the western hemisphere, the environment was set to facilitate the 
implementation of militarized policies that created the “War on Drug 
Traffickers.” This is an important distinction because the play on words changes 
the perception of the issue from one of drug addiction to one of weak institutions 
and insurgent/terrorist threat to those institutions.   
 
One cannot propose strategy to win, lose, or retreat from a war that one has been 
unable to identify properly.  The “War on Drugs” has motivated tremendous 
discourse on its failure and possible solutions to remedy its failure, but the 
generalizations made as a result of the inability to distinguish between the policies 
behind drug addiction and the militarized policies behind drug trafficking have 
discounted the effect of violence perpetrated by the State, the rationale for the 
State perpetrating that violence, and the dependence that State has on foreign 
actors to perpetrate such violence.  This makes it impossible to not only propose 
effective strategy but also persuade States that participate in the “War on Drug 
Traffickers” to adopt the proposed strategy.   
 
Ironically, “[t]he drug war hinders fundamental democratic institutional 
development, or more accurately, fosters the expansion of non-democratic 
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institutions and practices.”48 Currently, many states are struggling with this 
reality.  But, what motivated these states to implement these militarized counter-
narcotics policies? It is difficult to argue that these states were overwhelmed by 
drug addiction, as they would have followed in former President Richard Nixon’s 
footsteps with rehabilitative policies.   
 
Policies that involve military engagement between the state and drug traffickers 
suggests other motivating factors such as a lack of institutional capacity, lack of 
state structure, insecurity, corruption and/or lack of trust with the judiciary and 
police - issues that may not be affected by consumption policies such as 
rehabilitation or decriminalization.  If the motivating factors are lack of trust with 
the judiciary, for example, then the proposed policy should be a transnational 
trafficking court or other global assistance program that these states can lean on to 
develop their institutional capacity.  While this does not discount consumption-
focused policies, this paper merely asserts that more than consumption, or supply, 
or trafficking policies are necessary to deal with the underlying issues of current 
militarized drug policies.  Most importantly, this paper asserts that the motivating 
factors must be studied in implementing states before strategy and policy is 
proposed.  
Conclusion 
The “War on Drugs” is arguably the most successful slogan, before the “War on 
Terror,” to imply a strategic decision to politically engage absolutely nothing in 
particular. Yet it led to the strategic decision to militarily engage someone in 
particular. The brilliance in this was the ability of the slogan to take a group of 
commodities, converge them all under one label, victimize their consumer, 
criminalize or even demonize their supplier and therefore profiteer, while also 
creating a savior status for the holder of that slogan.  Even more brilliant was the 
ability of that slogan’s holder to expand that threat into a funding-stream for 
insurgents and terrorists threatening our democratic allies providing the ability for 
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engagement to occur militarily between the state and the now 
criminalized/demonized supplier/profiteer of those commodities.  
 
However, this brilliant slogan is dimming out as it continues to suffer some 
serious blows to its reputation.  The “War on Drug Traffickers” has never been 
distinguished, resulting in a lack of attention with the insecurities that led to 
militarized counter-narcotics policies around the world. While it was once a 
vibrant and aggressive slogan, its lifeline seems shorter than ever before, 
requiring states that have embraced the “War on Drugs” to decide where they go 
next.  But to understand the trajectory of this war, its estimated life expectancy, 
and/or even possible reincarnation, one must understand the states actively 
participating within that war and its expanded war, the “War on Drug 
Traffickers.”    
 
The U.S. arguably holds a dominant position within the implementation of 
prohibitionist counter-narcotics policies.  The relation of implementing states to 
the creator of the “War on Drugs” is one that may implicate the type of global 
policy expansion that occurred among these states.  Further studies must be 
conducted to provide a thorough analysis into the securitizing moves of these 
states and their dependency on the U.S., each other, as well as competitiveness 
with one another, and possible socialization or prior inclination to militarized 
policies.  A focus on the dependency these states have with the U.S. asserts that 
any prediction as to the implementing state’s future moves would have to involve 
the recognition of the implementing state’s sentiment toward the U.S. since the 
implementing state will either retaliate against the U.S. or continue to align itself 
with the U.S.  The motives behind implementation are keys to understanding 
where these states have gone with drug policy, where they are now, and where 
they might go tomorrow.    
 
  Active participants within the “War on Drugs” have been labeled as 
participants/victims under the now labeled failing U.S. “War on Drugs.” The 
unraveling of instability in these states, what many believe to be the result of 
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these failed policies, has socially diminished the notion that the “War on Drugs” 
can be won.  A push for ending their part, or anyone’s part, in the “War on Drugs” 
has become the headline catcher for today.  These advocates may be failing to 
recognize the inability for these states to follow suit with their media blitz and 
retreat from the “War on Drugs” because of their inability to deal with the drug 
trafficking opponent through other democratic means due to the lack of 
institutional capacity within the judiciary and police that motivated their 
participation with the “War on Drug Traffickers.”   
 
The “War on Drug Traffickers” involves a play on words that forces the 
policy maker to perceive a different threat, and rightfully so, because the policies 
already implemented were based on different threats.  Decriminalization and 
legalization do not address issues such as political and economic dependence, 
insecurity, conflict, or even geopolitical wants/needs.   The difference in wars 
equates to difference in policies, difference in consequences, and difference in 
motivations.  While the “War on Drugs” may be focused on the addictive qualities 
of drugs, the “War on Drug Traffickers” is most certainly not focused on the 
addictive qualities of drugs.  An understanding of why is essential to dealing with 
that why effectively. 
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